There are other perspectives about causation:
Three traditional ways causation operates: precipitating (sitting in this chair makes it squeak -- an event rather than a state), predisposing (the chair was predisposed to squeak because it was old and its joints were compromised), sustaining (when the air is dry, my chair's joints are more likely to squeak -- a state rather than an event). (of course events and states are matters of temporal perspective, and there is no litmus test for causation versus correlation). Sometimes causes and effects seem necessarily connected, othertimes, contingent (accidentally connected) (like obligate or facultative ?) And then David Hume raised the issue of necessity: unless necessity can be explained, it can't be discussed as a feature of the world, an objective regularity in nature. Or maybe it is a feature of mind -- and for Kant it was a feature of both. (discussed by Patricia Smith Churchland in Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosopy 2002, MIT Press) .
Aristotle's Four Causes
"To understand the nature of this significant shift from the old to the new science, we need to focus briefly on one of the most famous scientific statements from that older tradition, Aristotle's idea of the four causes for every natural event. If scientific speculation is, in very large part, a search for rational explanations of cause (i.e., for an answer to this question "What exactly causes this particular phenomenon?"), then, according to Aristotle, there were four possible ways of accounting for that cause: the Material Cause, the Efficient Cause, the Formal Cause, and the Final Cause.
The material cause explains the phenomenon in terms of the material out of which it is made; the efficient cause explains the phenomenon in terms of the process which puts the materials together; the formal cause explains the phenomenon in terms of the plan or design or arrangement of the materials; and the final cause explains the phenomenon in terms of its purpose (especially its moral purpose).
So, for example, if we wanted to account for the existence of, say, a house, the material cause would be the wood, nails, glass, concrete, and so on which make up the house; the efficient cause would be the actions of the various workers who constructed it (carpenters, roofers, carpet layers, and so on); the formal cause would be the architectural design and drawings; the final cause would be a moral reason why the house ought to be built at all and why it should look the way it does in the wider context of the community and the world.
The explanations sought by classical and medieval science were concerned above all with the final cause, that is, with an account of whatever one was speculating about which placed it in the overall moral scheme of the universe, linking that object or institution with a sense of moral purposiveness and hence with the divine structure of the universe (what Plato and Aristotle call the Good and the Christian tradition identified with God). This was the central purpose in almost all the most important speculations of Greek and Medieval philosophy about the natural world, simply because for these thinkers the most challenging fact of life was an ethical and religious concern: knowledge about the world only mattered if it helped people to understand how they ought to behave (i.e., gave them insight into the ultimate standards of morality and justice). Such thinking is called teleological (from the Greek word telos meaning goal), because it seeks explanations for things in terms of their final purposes."